On January 26, 2026, the Iranian state-aligned APT group MuddyWater - tracked by researchers as Earth Vetala (Trend Micro), Mango Sandstorm (Microsoft), and MUDDYCOAST (NATO) - launched a structured cyber offensive campaign designated Operation Olalampo. The campaign targets government and enterprise organizations across the Middle East and North Africa. Group-IB published a detailed analysis in February 2026, documenting new malware families, AI-assisted development techniques, and diversified command-and-control infrastructure.
KEY FACTS
- WhatIranian APT espionage campaign targeting MENA governments and enterprises.
- WhoMuddyWater (MOIS-linked), one of Iran's most persistent cyber operations groups.
- New MalwareGhostFetch, CHAR (Rust backdoor), HTTP_VIP, GhostBackDoor.
- InnovationAI-assisted malware development - confirmed by researchers.
- C2 Infrastructure: Telegram channels used for command-and-control.
- TargetsGovernment ministries, defense, energy, telecommunications across Gulf states.
WHAT HAPPENED
On January 26, 2026, MuddyWater - an Iranian state-aligned APT group linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) - launched Operation Olalampo, a structured espionage campaign targeting government and enterprise organizations across the Middle East and North Africa. The group, tracked as Earth Vetala by Trend Micro, Mango Sandstorm by Microsoft, and MUDDYCOAST by NATO, deployed a new arsenal of malware families purpose-built for this campaign. Group-IB published a detailed technical analysis in February 2026, documenting the operation's scope and capabilities.
Initial access followed two parallel vectors: spear-phishing emails with malicious Office macros, and exploitation of recently disclosed vulnerabilities on public-facing servers. This dual-vector approach ensures that organizations with strong email filtering can still be reached through unpatched internet-exposed infrastructure.
The campaign introduced four new malware families and incorporated AI-assisted development techniques - both firsts for MuddyWater.
THE MALWARE ARSENAL
GhostFetch: A downloader that establishes initial foothold and retrieves secondary payloads. Drops GhostBackDoor - an advanced implant providing persistent access, keylogging, screen capture, and data exfiltration capabilities.
CHAR: A Rust-based backdoor - MuddyWater's first known use of Rust for malware development. Rust provides memory safety guarantees that make the malware more stable and harder to reverse-engineer. The choice of Rust indicates a deliberate investment in tooling sophistication.
HTTP_VIP: An alternative downloader using HTTP-based communication, providing redundancy if Telegram-based channels are disrupted.
Telegram C2: Using Telegram's API for command-and-control makes traffic harder to distinguish from legitimate messaging activity. Multiple Telegram channels provide redundant C2 paths.
THE AI DIMENSION
MuddyWater is using AI to accelerate code generation, obfuscation, and potentially to adapt malware behavior based on target environment. This represents a qualitative shift in the group's capability and aligns with the broader trend of state-sponsored groups incorporating AI into offensive operations, as documented by the UAE Cybersecurity Council's February 2026 report on AI-powered attack tools.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
- MuddyWater / Earth Vetala / Mango Sandstorm / MUDDYCOAST
- SponsorIran MOIS
- GhostFetch - First-stage downloader
- CHAR (LampoRAT) - Rust-based backdoor, first known MuddyWater use of Rust
- HTTP_VIP - HTTP-based downloader, deploys AnyDesk
- GhostBackDoor - Second-stage implant
- codefusiontech[.]org
- miniquest[.]org
- promoverse[.]org
- jerusalemsolutions[.]com
- 162[.]0[.]230[.]185
- 209[.]74[.]87[.]100
- 143[.]198[.]5[.]41
- 209[.]74[.]87[.]67
- Botstager_51_bot (ID: 8398566164, display name: Olalampo)
- SHA256:
81a6e6416eb7ab6ce6367c6102c031e2ae2730c3c50ab9ce0b8668fec3487848(CHAR/LampoRAT)
- Service nameMicrosoftVersionUpdater
- Process masquerading as avp.exe (Kaspersky)
ZERO|TOLERANCE Advisory
Macro Execution Policies - block VBA macros from internet-sourced Office documents
Telegram Traffic Monitoring - inspect and control Telegram API traffic at network boundaries
Rust Binary Analysis - invest in Rust reverse-engineering capabilities for SOC teams
Threat Intelligence Sharing - participate in MENA-specific threat intelligence platforms
Public-Facing Server Hardening - aggressive patching cadence for internet-exposed systems
SOURCES
Group-IB, The Hacker News, SC Media, SecurityOnline, Halcyon, ThousandGuards